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GIFT TAX INAPPLICABLE TO INTEREST-FREE, INTRA-FAMILY
DEMAND LOANS
Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978)
In Crown v. Commissioner' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit admittedthat the economic reality of not imposing
gift tax liability for interest-free, intra-family demand loans opens a
significant loophole in the tax statutes, but found that practical and
theoretical valuation problems preclude taxation under the present gift
tax statutes.2
The taxpayer in Crown was one of three brothers who had equal
interests in a general partnership. Prior to and during 1967 the partner-
ship made a series of interest-free demand loans3 to twenty-four trusts
for the partners' relatives.4 The total amount of the loans outstanding
on the books of the partnership on December 31, 1967, was approxi-
mately $18 million.5 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency of
$362,135.92 on the taxpayer's gift tax return for 1967, consisting of one-
third of the amount of the partnership's gift allegedly made by virtue of
the loans,6 and valued the deficiency by computing the amount of in-
terest a party bargaining at arm's length would have charged.7 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court8 and held- Intra-family,9 inter-
est-free demand loans do not subject the lender to federal gift tax liabil-
ity on the transfer of the right to the use of the loaned funds.'
Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) provides for a
1. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
2. Id.
3. Thirteen percent of the indebtedness was represented by notes payable on demand and
x7l, consisted of loans on open account. Id. at 235. Both the open account loans and demand
notes were considered to be loans payable on demand, equivalent for tax purposes. Id. at 237 n.9.
The demand notes provided for interest payable at 6% per annum after demand; the open account
loans had no interest provisions. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1061 (1977), aft'd, 585
F 2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
4. 585 F.2d at 235.
5. Id,
6. 67 T.C. at 1061.
7. The Commissioner determined a reasonable rate of interest to be 6% per annum and
applied that rate on a daily basis to the outstanding balance. Id. During 1967 the market prime
rate of interest ranged between 5.5% and 6%, averaging 5.63%. Id.
8, 585 F.2d 234.
9. Gifts made to a trust are treated as gifts to the beneficiaries of the trust and not as gifts to
the trustee or to the trust as a legal entity. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941).
10. 585 F.2d at 235.
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tax on "the transfer of property by gift."" I.R.C. section 2511(a) elabo-
rates that "the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the
transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect,
and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible."
Property transferred directly is taxed on its value at the time of the
transfer;' 2 property transferred by exchange is taxed on the excess of its
value over the consideration received by the donor.' 3 The legislative
history indicates Congress intended these provisions to be broadly con-
strued,'4 and the regulations' 5 and case law' 6 support the expansive
applicability of the general language of the gift tax statutes to specific
transfers of varied interests and forms.17
The two main purposes of the gift tax are to prevent avoidance of
higher income tax rates through income-splitting and to prevent avoid-
11. I.R.C.§2501.
12. I.R.C. § 2512(a) provides: "if the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of
the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift."
13. I.R.C. § 2512(b) provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded
the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing
the amount of gifts made during the calendar quarter.
Id.
14. The terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are used in the broadest
and most comprehensive sense; the term "property" reaching every species of right or
interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value.
The words "transfer. . .by gift" and "whether. . .direct or indirect" are designed to
cover and comprehend all transactions (subject to certain express conditions and limita-
tions) whereby, and to the extent . . . that, property or a property right is donatively
passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or the device employed in
its accomplishment.
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1932).
15. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958) provides in pertinent part:
The gift tax applies to a transfer by way of gift whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible. For example, a taxable transfer may be effected by the
creation of a trust, the forgiving of a debt, the assignment of a judgment, the assignment
of the benefits of an insurance policy, or the transfer of cash, certificates of deposit, or
Federal, State or municipal bonds.
Id.
16. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S.
176 (1943); Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973). For examples of interests
defined as "property" for gift tax purposes, see Talge v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836 (W.D.
Mo. 1964) (patents and patent applications); Rollman v. United States, 342 F.2d 62 (Ct. Cl. 1965)
(assignment of rents).
17. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
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ance of estate taxes through depletion of the taxpayer's estate., Ac-
cordingly, income derived from the use of loaned funds is taxable to
the borrower, 9 and the lender pays no gift tax on the transfer of the
principal.2" If, however, the lender invests the funds himself and trans-
fers the income derived therefrom to the recipient, instead of making a
loan, the lender will be subject to an income tax on the receipt of in-
come 2' as well as a gift tax on the transfer of the income.22 Thus, the
use of an interest-free loan can result in tax savings to the lender by
splitting his income to avoid the gift tax.23 To prevent the use of trusts
to split income and avoid taxes, the regulations order treatment of in-
come payments to revocable trusts24 as gifts from the settlor to the ben-
eficiary during the calendar years in which the payments are made.25
An interest-free loan depletes the lender's estate only to the extent of
the uncompensated deprivation of the use of the loaned money prior to
repayment.26 The general rule for valuation of taxable property is the
"fair market value" rule.27 The present fair market value of the prom-
18. The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the income tax. It will tend to
reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future income from the
donated property may be to a number of persons, with the result that taxes imposed by
the higher brackets of income tax are avoided.
H R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong,, 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1932).
Eg., Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179
n 1 (1943).
19. I.R.C. § 61(a).
20. A gift is incomplete in every instance in which the donor reserves the power to revest the
beneficial title to the property in himself. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
21. I.R.C. § 61(a).
22. I.R.C. § 2501. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958); notes 15-16 supra and accompany-
ing text.
23. See Burke, Interest-Free Loans-4 Valuable Family Tax Planning Tool?, 48 TAXES 137,
137-38 (1970); O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1085, 1093 (1974);
Comment Tax Consequences ofan Interest Free Loan, 24 Loy. L. REv. 33, 34 (1978); 38 OHIo ST.
L J. 903, 909 (1977).
24. Irrevocable, short term trusts receive tax treatment similar to that of revocable trusts.
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940).
25, Treas. Reg, § 25.2511-2(f) (1958) provides in pertinent part:
The receipt of income or of other enjoyment of the transferred property by the transferee
or by the beneficiary. . . during the interim between the making of the initial transfer
and the relinquishment or termination of the power operates to free such income or other
enjoyment from the power, and constitutes a gift of such income.
Id See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (trust income is taxable to donor retaining control
of trust though income is paid to donee-beneficiary); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933)
iupholding predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (1958)).
26. The loan principal is included in the lender's estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-4 (1958).
27. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958). "Fair market value" is defined as "the price at which
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ise to repay a term loan is the present discounted value of the loan.28
The present value of the promise to repay a demand loan, however, is
incapable of determination because the duration of the loan is by defi-
nition uncertain and unknown.2 9
In business settings, courts have held that the right to use interest-
free funds is not taxable as a receipt of income30 or as a constructive
dividend,' absent specific statutory and regulatory authority permit-
ting taxation of imputed interest.32 In a variety of nonbusiness transac-
the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Id.
The same language is found under the gift tax regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1965).
28. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (1958) (valuation of remainders or reversionary interests);
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(d) (1958) (same).
29. To be able to determine the present value of a promise to repay a loan, the length of the
period during which the loaned property is to be held must be known. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
7(d) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (d) (1958).
30. See Saunders v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968) (net amount derived
from use of interest-free loans not taxable as ordinary income but rather as capital under circum-
stances of transaction), rev'don other groundr, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971); Dean v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1089 (1961) (imputed income to taxpayer as result of receiving interest-free
loan held to be unrealized income because it would be offset by deduction for interest expense).
For the view that the right to the use of money should be taxed as income to the borrower, see
Comment, Income and Gft Tax Implications ofInterest-Free Loans Between Relatives, 1978 B.Y.L.
REV. 155; Comment, Taxing as Income the Receipt of Interest-Free Loans, 33 U. CH. L. REV. 346
(1966), reprintedin 44 TAXES 544 (1966). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (1958).
31. See Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1974) (eco-
nomic benefit of funds loaned interest-free insufficient to give rise to constructive dividend be-
cause treated by both parties as corporate obligation).
32. An obvious method which can be used to milk one commonly controlled organiza-
tion for the benefit of another is the making of interest free loans. Under this method,
the lending entity, by not reporting interest on the loans, has lower earnings and, conse-
quently, lower taxes. By not paying interest, the borrowing entity, if it has no net taxable
income, merely eliminates a deduction which otherwise, would increase its losses. As a
group the commonly controlled organizations pay less income tax than they would if
they had dealt at arm's length and charged interest on the loans.
Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199, 212 (1977). I.R.C. § 482 now authorizes
the Commissioner to allocate income and deductions among businesses controlled by the same
interests if necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect the income of such organiza-
tions. The regulations contain a "safe haven" provision that indicates to the taxpayer a range of
interest rates that will not result in imputation of interest income and tax liability thereon. Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(2) (1975). Otherwise, the Commissioner can successfully impute and allocate
income under § 482 through the application of a fixed percentage without regard to whether inter-
est income was actually generated. Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1973)
(whether borrowed funds produced income to borrowing corporations was "of no importance");
B. Forman. Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1156 (2d Cir.) (allocation to the taxpayers of
interest income at 5% on their loans to a corporation that they had formed was proper even though
the taxpayers had waived the right to interest on the loan), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972);
Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199 (1977) (§ 482 authorizes the Commis-
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tions, however, courts have held taxable the transfer of the right to use
money: a district court held forgiveness of interest due to be a taxable
transfer under section 2501;33 the Tax Court held a gift of bonds to be a
taxable gift of the interest and bonds even when the interest has not
matured;3 4 and the difference between a below-market interest rate
charged and the usual rate of interest is a taxable gift.35 Further, the
Seventh Circuit recently held the gratuitous transfer to a charitable or-
ganization of the right to use money is deductible as a gift.36
The initial judicial consideration of the gift tax treatment of intra-
,ioner to impute interest on noninterest bearing loans between parent and subsidiary corporations
even if income is not produced by the proceeds), rev'g PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55
T C. 928 (1970). See Crawford, Are the Courts Expanding the Scope of Code Section 482?, 36 J.
T,\x. 150 (1972).
Latham purports to overrule Kahier. but the Kahler test was whether the loan from the taxpayer
to the controlled group would have been interest-free in an arm's length transaction with an unin-
terested, uncontrolled party. The question of income was of no importance. Kahler Corp. v.
Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1973).
I.R.C. § 483 requires that interest be imputed as a component of certain deferred payments
made in the sale or exchange of property. I.R.C. § 483. This provision was enacted to prevent the
practice of hiding interest payments in the selling price of certain property sales. This provision is
applicable only to transfers of more than $3,000 for more than one year. I.R.C. § 483(f). As with
§ 482 transactions, prior to the enactment of § 483, courts refused to impute interest income. See,
e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 461 (1961), af'd, 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963), af'd, 380
U.S. 563 (1965); Pretzer v. United States, 61-1 U.S.T.C. § 9477 (Ariz. 1961).
33. Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900, 917 (E.D. La. 1975) (par-
ent's cancellation of son's obligation to pay interest on loan was gift of the amount of interest
forgiven; distinguished Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), see notes 38-
40 infra and accompanying text, on ground that there was contractual duty to pay interest). But
cf Estate of Lang v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404, 413 (1975) (decedent allowed statute of limita-
tions to run on loan to son; Commissioner assessed gift tax on principal only).
34. Affelder v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1190 (1946).
For a discussion of the tax consequences of other kinds of property transfers, see Estate of Bell
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973) (stock transfer by parents to children in exchange for annui-
ties was taxable gift of excess of fair market value over discounted value of annuity).
35. Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); see notes 42-43 infra and accompanying
text.
36. Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975), noted in Duhl & Fine, New Case
.4loking Interest Deduction Calls for Reappraisal of No-Interest Loans, 44 J. TAX. 34 (1976). See
also Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
Under the gift tax statute, "[donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential
clement in the application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the tax is based on the
objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the
subjective motives of the donor." Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(g)(1) (1958). For a charitable deduction
under I.R.C. § 170, subjective donative intent is required to establish that a "gift" has been made.
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); see Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d
243. 246 (2d Cir. 1946). The phrase "transfer of property," however, is treated identically under
I.R.C. §§ 170 & 2501. Once deemed a gift, the "parties' expectations or hopes as to the tax treat-
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family, interest-free demand loans occurred in 1966. In Johnson v.
United States37 a federal district court concluded that such loans were
not gifts of the use of money within the meaning of section 2501. Be-
cause the unpaid amount of the loans was recorded as and includible as
an asset in the lender's estate, the loan did not defeat the purpose of the
gift tax to protect the estate from depletion by untaxed inter vivos
gifts.3" Furthermore, the lender was under no duty to lend or otherwise
invest the money and the recipients were under no express or statutory
duty to pay interest. 39 The court suggested that provision for a tax on
the value of intra-family loans should come from Congress and not
from the courts.40
The IRS did not appeal the Johnson decision and waited nearly
seven years before indicating its non-acquiescence. 4 t In 1973 the Com-
missioner ruled that a parent who made large interest-free loans to his
child's wholly owned corporation incurred gift tax liability.42 In his
ment of their conduct have nothing to do with the matter." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 286 (1960).
For a case involving the rent-free use of real property under the charitable gift deduction provi-
sion, see Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
If the right to use real estate is to be regarded as "merely" an incidental privilege we
suppose it might also be said with equal logic that the right to remove the oil from an oil
well is "merely" a privilege and that the really important thing is who owns the hole in
the ground.
Id. at 686. The same might well be said about the privilege to use money. See also Thriftimart,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 598, 615 (1973) (charitable deduction of fair rental value allowed on
rent-free, term lease of real property); Allen v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 12, 13 (1971) (charitable
deduction of fair rental value of interest conveyed allowed on rent-free, term lease). Sullivan v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 228, 231 (1951) (deduction allowed for gift made when taxpayer conveyed
property "for duration of war"). But cf Rev. Rul. 70-72, 1970-1 C.B. 15 (tenant farmer earns no
income from use of dwelling supplied by landowner). The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, 83 Stat. 487, altered I.R.C. § 170(0(3) to require that a donor relinquish all rights in prop-
erty to qualify for the charitable gift deduction. This change reflected a congressional policy deci-
sion that the gift of the use of property should not result in a deduction, provided the donor
retained a beneficial interest in the property, rather than a denial that the use value of a proprie-
tary interest could never be subject to transfer by gift.
37. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). See 5 Hous. L. REV. 138 (1967); 65 Micni. L. REv.
1014 (1967); 19 STAN. L. REV. 870 (1967).
38. 254 F. Supp. at 77. The court did not discuss the other commonly accepted purpose of
the gift tax: the prevention of income tax avoidance through income splitting. See note 19 supra
and accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
42. Id.
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ruling, the Commissioner set forth an interpretation of the scope of the
gift tax contrary to that in the Johnson decision:
The right to use property, in this case money, is itself an interest in
property, the transfer of which is a gift within the purview of section 2501
of the Code unless full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth is received. The tax in the instant case would be imposed on the
value of the right to use the money. Such value is usually stated in terms
of interest or some other equivalent in money or money's worth. The rate
of interest that would represent full and adequate consideration may
vary, depending upon the actual circumstances pertaining to the
transaction.43
In Crown v. Commissioner' the Seventh Circuit upheld the Tax
Court's45 rejection of the Commissioner's imposition of a gift tax on
intra-family, interest-free demand loans. Judge Wood, writing for the
court, recognized that the making of an interest-free demand loan
43. Id. at 409. For a term loan, -the value of the right to the use of the money loaned is
ascertainable by accepted actuarial methods, as of the date the money and note were exchanged,
and is, therefore, subject to the gift tax at that time." Id. For a demand loan, "[tihe value of the
use of the money during the calendar quarter is calculable as of the last day of each calendar
quarter during which the corporation granted such use," and the amount of gift should be calcu-
lated then rather than at the date of the exchange. Id.
The IRS predicted that no tax effect would result in most cases involving small interest-free
loans because the $3,000 per donee exclusion would operate as a floor to tax liability. Id. I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) provides for this exclusion:
In computing taxable gifts for the calendar quarter, in the case of gifts. . . made to any
person by the donor during the calendar year 1971 and subsequent calendar years,
$3,(0 of such gifts to such person less the aggregate of the amounts of such gifts to such
person during all preceding calendar quarters of the calendar year shall not. . . be in-
cluded in the total amount of gifts made during such quarter.
Id. Following the IRS method suggested in Rev. Rul. 73-61, Feinschreiber & Granwell calcu-
lated, for loans of varying terms, the amounts required to be transferred to yield a value in excess
of the exclusionary floor. Feinschreiber & Granwell, IRS Imputes Interest on Loans Between Fam-
dr' Members, 51 TAXES 294 (1973). Their results support the IRS prediction that only large loans
would be taxable under this method, assuming, of course, that the benefits of the exclusion were
not already depleted by prior gifts. Id.
The $30,000 lifetime exemption provision, also cited in the Ruling as a check on the practical
impact of the IRS holding, 1973-1 C.B. at 409, was repealed in 1976.
Other provisions not suggested by the IRS, but which might operate as a limit on the applicabil-
ity of the tax are: I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1), which provides that: "A gift made by one spouse to any
other person other than his spouse shall . . be considered as made one-half by him and one-half
by his spouse" and I.R.C. § 2503(c), which excludes certain transfers for the benefit of minors.
44. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977). The Tax Court opinion was commented
upon extensively: 42 ALB. L. REV. 471 (1978); 19 B.C.L. REV. 359 (1978); 24 Loy. L. REV. 33
(1978); 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 903 (1977): 9 RUT.-CAM, L.J. 579 (1978); 23 VILL. L. REV. 625 (1978); 14
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 150 (1977).
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would result in an economic benefit to the borrower, 46 leaving the
lender poorer by the amount of interest foregone or by his inability to
use the loaned funds to otherwise increase his net worth.47 The court
acknowledged that interest-free loans facilitated income-splitting in
contravention of one of the purposes of the gift tax.48
The court, however, following the reasoning of the Johnson court
and the Tax Court in Crown, refuted the Commissioner's two theories,
which postulated that failure to subject interest-free demand loans to
gift tax treatment would allow evasion of the estate tax.49 First, unlike
term loans,50 there is no reason to expect that the value of the promise
to repay a demand loan is substantially less than the face value of the
loan, because the lender may demand payment at any time. Thus, the
court rejected the argument that because of the time-value of money,
the estate is depleted by the difference between the amount of money
loaned and the present value of the promise to repay.5' The court also
rejected the Commissioner's second argument that the lender's estate
will be depleted by the "opportunity cost," the amount of income the
loaned funds may generate. Judge Wood noted that a taxpayer was not
duty bound "to cultivate the fruits of his capital . . . and will not be
46. The court looked directly at the economic consequences of the loan transaction. 585 F.2d
at 235. The Johnson decision, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), and the Tax Court majority in
Crown were heavily criticized for failing to consider the "economic realities" of the interest-free
loan. 585 F.2d, at 236; Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1065 (1977) (J. Simpson, dissent-
ing); see secondary sources cited in note 45 supra.
47. This missed chance to increase wealth is termed the "opportunity cost" of the loan. 585
F.2d at 235. The court went further to note that it was not necessary that the interest rate be set at
zero for the economic benefits to be transferred to the recipient; the interest rate need only be less
than the appropriate market rate of interest. Id.
48. Id. at 236. The Johnson decision, 254 F. Supp. 73, and the Tax Court in Crown both
failed to consider the income splitting issue though the facts in Crown suggest precisely this in-
tended result: $16,000,000 of the funds were lent for the purpose of investment in a partnership
known as Henry Crown & Co., 67 T.C. at 1061. The name of the partnership suggests that it
comprised family members in whom the taxpayer sought to invest his money with the investment
benefits to pass to low income family members without taxation in his income brackets. See note
18 suora and accompanying text on the income-splitting issue and the gift tax statute, The court
rejected petitioner's argument that protection of the income tax is only a "natural consequence" of
the gift tax rather than one of its purposes. 585 F.2d at 235 n.2.
49. 585 F.2d at 236.
50. The dissent in the Tax Court in Crown apparently did not find controlling the difference
between a term loan and a demand loan in calculating the depletion of the taxpayer's estate. 67
T.C. at 1069-70.
51. 585 F.2d at 236. The Commissioner offered no evidence showing that demand notes
systematically trade in the market place at a significant discount from face value, id. at 238, or
even that the right to use funds loaned on demand has an exchangeable value. Id. at 239.
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taxed as if he had when he hasn't," but conceded that "[p]ermitting
others to enjoy the economic benefits of an asset can be seen as one
means of exerting control over the asset's economic potential."52 This
was not determinative, however, because there was no evidence that
Congress, in protecting the estate tax, "was concerned with the use of
gifts to diminish a taxpayer's potential estate as well as his actual
one."53
The court agreed with the Commissioner that there are good policy
reasons for taxing interest-free loans because nontaxation would result
in different tax consequences for economically similar transactions, for
example, for loans to irrevocable trusts or the establishment of revoca-
ble trusts. 4 The court, expressly reserving decision on the issue, noted
that the differential between the present discounted value and face
amount of interest-free term loans might be taxable as a gift.55 Policy
reasons, however, were insufficient to support a finding of taxability
because the scope of the gift tax statute was simply not broad enough to
52. 585 F.2d at 236-37. The court noted that this might serve as a theoretical basis for distin-
guishing gifts, similar to those in Crown, from other situations in which the taxpayer lets his
productive property lie totally fallow. Id. at 237. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 10-11 to 10-12 (4th ed. 1978).
The court's approach is similar to that set forth in Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (1958), requiring
income payments paid to revocable trusts to be taxed to the settlor as gifts because of his retained
control over the trust corpus. See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930).
53. 585 F.2d at 237.
54. Id. If the taxpayer contributes the money to an irrevocable trust, a gift of the discounted
value of the income of the trust for the trust term will result at the time of the trust's creation; but
no further gifts will occur if the income actually paid to the beneficiary is in excess of this amount.
, The court viewed the revocable trust as even more analogous to a demand loan, but noted the
important distinction that a trust beneficiary is given income already produced by the capital,
while the borrower in a demand loan is given only the opportunity to use the principal produc-
tively. Id. at 237 n.8.
55. Id. at 237 n.7, (citing Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975), and Blackburn
v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953)). See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
At oral argument the taxpayer conceded that the present discounted value of a no-interest, term
loan would be less than its face amount. This led the court to suggest that a gift might be found
under section 2512(b), referring to Mason and Blackburn. The IRS relied on Blackburn in Rev.
Rul. 73-61. as did Judge Simpson in his dissent from the Tax Court majority in Crown, 67 T.C. at
1068 (Simpson, J., dissenting), in reasoning for a finding of taxability of demand loans. Neither
distinguished Blackburn on the ground that it involved a term loan rather than a demand loan.
Although both the IRS and Judge Simpson noted that some interest had been charged in Black-
burn rather than none, as in the Johnson and Crown cases, neither felt this distinction was mate-
ral. 67 T.C. at 1068 (Simpson, J., dissenting); Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, 409. See note 47
upra.
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apply to a demand loan transaction. 6
The court also rejected the Commissioner's statutory arguments for
taxing demand loans. The Commissioner first argued that the interest-
free demand loan was an "unequal exchange" under section 2512(b),57
because at the time of the loan the lender transferred to the borrower
an asset worth more than the promise for repayment received as con-
sideration. The court noted that although this argument might be
sound in the abstract, it was flawed in application because of the im-
possibility of instantaneous repayment.58 The value of the right to re-
payment is both unknown, because the Commissioner offered no
evidence "showing that demand notes systematically trade at a signifi-
cant discount from face value in the marketplace, '59 and unknowable,
because no present discount formula can be applied in the absence of
knowledge of when the loan will be repaid.6" The Commissioner's at-
tempt at valuation by assessing the tax once a taxing quarter has
passed 6 1 was inaccurate as well as theoretically inconsistent with the
proffered theory of taxation because it compared values at two points in
time,62 could have resulted in a tax on more than the face amount of
the loan, 63 and was based on the unfounded assumption that when
56. 585 F.2d at 237. The court reviewed the extremely expansive application of the gift tax.
Id. at 237-38.
57. Id. at 238. See note 13 supra for text of this provision.
58. 585 F.2d at 238.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court noted:
The most that can be said is that the eventual value of the notes expressed in terms of a
present discounted value as of the time of the loan will range somewhere between zero
and the face amount of the notes. The reason that the value at the time of the loan
cannot be determined with greater certainty is that the transfer of the economic benefit is
incomplete at that point, being yet totally dependent on the lender's continued willing-
ness to refrain from demanding repayment.
Id. See note 29 supra.
61. This is the method suggested in Rev. Rul. 73-61. See note 43 supra.
62. The court noted "the 'unequal exchange' approach of Section 2512(b) implicitly assumes
that the values being compared will be measured at the same point in time, just as Section 2512(a)
requires that an outright gift of property be valued at the date of the gift." 585 F.2d at 239.
63. The failure to discount the interest imputed in subsequent periods back to the time
of the loan leads to the seeming paradox that if the lender were to permit the interest-free
loan to remain outstanding for a sufficiently long period before demanding repayment,
he would end up paying more in gift taxes than he would have had he made an outright
gift of the loan principle.
Id. at 239. The court gave an example of this paradox, but then qualified its importance:
For example, if a lender makes a $1,000 no-interest loan and the "proper" interest rate is
10%, under the IRS formula he would be treated as having made a gift of$100 in each
year the loan remains outstanding. Thus, if the loan remains outstanding for 20 years,
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making the loan the borrower and lender predetermined that the loan
would be outstanding for the period during which the Commissioner
sought to apply the tax.64
The Commissioner alternatively argued that under section 2512(b)
the right to use money loaned on demand is a discrete proprietary in-
terest gratuitously transferred, analogous to the right to use property in
a tenancy at will.65 The court rejected this argument because the right
to use money lacks the necessary attributes of a property interest. The
right is not "protected by law" and has no "exchangeable value. ' 66 A
recipient of a demand loan does not have a legally protected interest
vis-a-vis the lender,67 and even if the theoretical existence of an ex-
changeable value is conceded, 68 the Commissioner's method of mea-
suring that value is "seriously deficient. '69
The court then rejected the Commissioner's variation of his argu-
ments-that the gift is completed when and to the extent the lender
he will be treated as having made gifts totaling $2,000, whereas he would only have been
taxed on $1,000 if he had made a gift of the principal in the first place. However, the
paradox is one of nominal rather than real values. In the case of the outright gift the tax
is paid immediately, while under the loan the tax is paid at various points in the future.
Because of the time-value of money. the present value of the two alternatives may be
about the same.
Id. at 239 n.14.
64. Id. at 239. As suggested earlier, see note 55 supra and accompanying text, courts are
likely to subject interest-free, term loans to gift taxation under the present gift tax laws because of
the absence of the valuation problems associated with demand loans.
65. 585 F.2d at 239.
66. Id. These attributes are apparently drawn from the language of the congressional re-
ports. See note 14 supra.
67. 585 F.2d at 239.
68 The court carefully distinguished the conceptual difference between the right to use
money and money itself. While money itself, of course, has an exchangeable value, the Commis-
sioner offered no evidence showing that the borrower's "at will" interest had an exchangeable
value. Id. One should further distinguish between interest and the right to use money. The two
are tied together because the amount of interest demanded usually correlates with the value of the
ue rights transferred by a loan, how much money is transferred and for how long, and any other
limitations on use. The precise problem here is that while the right to use money has been trans-
ferred, it is difficult to estimate a correlating interest rate that ordinarily would have been
demanded.
69. Id. The court distinguished cases, such as Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955), in which the court rejected an IRS attempt to tax as a gift
a series of payments received by virtue of an earlier transferred right, in favor of a single tax on
the right at the time of transfer, because in this case the right transferred was revocable. 585 F.2d
at 239 n.16. See notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text. See also Putoma Corp. v. Commis-
,ioner, 66 T.C. 652 (1976) (court refused to treat shareholder's cancellation of debt of the corpora-
tion as an assignment of income to the corporation).
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refrains from demanding repayment-because it would require stretch-
ing the gift tax concept of what constitutes a property right.70  This
"cancellation of the indebtedness" argument rests on the unsupported
premises that the borrower is under a legal obligation to pay for the
right to use money (interest), and that the lender subsequently and con-
tinuously forgave the obligation.7
Judge Wood further noted that judicial broadening of the scope of
the gift tax to cover demand loans would be without precedent 72 and
contrary to the proper role of the judiciary.73 It would involve the
courts in the difficult task of determining an appropriate interest rate
for imputation without statutory or regulatory guidelines, 74 and the tax
would reach other currently untaxed exchanges of economic benefit.7
Furthermore, the equities were with the taxpayer, who made the loans
seven years before the publication of the Commissioner's nonacquies-
cence in the Johnson decision.76 The court pointedly left undecided the
70. 585 F.2d at 240.
71. Id.
72. The court characterized Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975), Commis-
sioner v. Edwards, 135 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1943), and Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204
(1953), as indirect support for the "unequal exchange" approach under § 2512(b). 585 F.2d at 240.
Like the Tax Court below, the Crown court pointed to the courts' consistent rejection of the IRS
attempt to impute taxable income to the recipients of interest-free loans. Id. (citing Joseph Lupo-
witz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974); Saunders v. United States, 294 F.
Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'don other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971); and Dean v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961)). See notes 30-31 supra for a summary of the holdings of
these cases.
73. 585 F.2d at 241.
74. Id. at 240-41.
75. Id. at 241. The Johnson court, 254 F. Supp. at 77, and the Tax Court below, 67 T.C. at
1065, seemed primarily concerned with situations involving the gratuitous use or sharing of real or
personal property among relatives. The Seventh Circuit went further and suggested the principle
of taxability might be extended to an office worker lending $10 until the next payday, a neighbor
borrowing a lawnmower, or out-of-town guests who are provided free lodging with friends instead
of staying at a hotel. 585 F.2d at 241.
76. Johnson was decided in 1966; the Crown loan transactions took place in 1967; Rev. Rul.
73-61 was issued in 1973; the Commissioner first assessed the gift tax deficiency for the Crown
transaction in 1973. The IRS did not argue that the loans were within the coverage of section
2512(b) until argument before the Seventh Circuit. 585 F.2d at 241 n.19.
The Tax Court in Crown saw the IRS assertion of taxability long after the basic statute had
been enacted as the "crux of the matter," but the dissent correctly noted the established tax princi-
ple that recent adoption of a position does not render it invalid, provided the Commissioner is
acting within his authority, and he may, even retroactively, change an incorrect interpretation of
the law as previously applied by him. 67 T.C. at 1070 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citing Dixon v.
United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965), and Auto Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957)).
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232
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possible validity of a prospective regulation making such loans taxable
absent specific statutory authority. 77
Judge Van Pelt, in dissent, argued that the gift tax statutes are broad
enough to encompass the gratuitous transfer of a proprietary interest
such as the right to use money, even though not specifically enumerated
in the statute or regulations; therefore no judicial stretching is required
to tax the lender.78
The Crown case is an example of how concepts of valuation become
intertwined with analysis of the basic definition of a taxable gift. The
1974); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); Anderson, Clay-
ton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 979 (5th Cir. 1977); Dobbs v. Costle, 559 F.2d 946, 948-
49 (5th Cir. 1977); Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 774 (2d Cir. 1976); Quinn v. Commis-
sioner, 524 F.2d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1975); Matson Navigation v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 847, 852
(1977); I.R.C. § 7805(a) & (b).
Suggested factors to be used in reviewing the Commissioner's exercise of his discretionary pow-
ers to adopt retroactive regulations are:
(1) whether or to what extent the taxpayer justifiably relied on settled prior law or policy
and whether or to what extent the putatively retroactive regulation alters the law; (2) the
extent, if any, to which the prior law or policy has been implicitly approved by Congress,
as by legislative re-enactment of the pertinent Code provisions; (3) whether retroactivity
would advance or frustrate the interest in equality of treatment among similarly situated
taxpayers; and (4) whether according retroactive effect would produce an inordinately
harsh result.
Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 1977). Judge Learned
Hand's comments on paying taxes are apposite: "Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right,
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions,
not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant." Commis-
,ioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947).
The dissent in the Tax Court below noted:
lE]ven though the discounted value of a demand note cannot be ascertained, the privi-
lege of using the borrowed funds interest free is nonetheless valuable. The difference in
facts means merely that we must find a different means for measuring the value of such
privilege, and we are satisfied that the method used by the Commissioner is reasonable.
Instead of valuing the obligation for repayment at the time of its creation, we wait until
the money has been used for some period of time and then measure the value of such
use.
67 T.C. at 1069 (Simpson, J., dissenting). "Reasonableness" and whether the Commissioner con-
sidered "all relevant factors" is the standard of review over the Commissioner's determination of
the value of transferred property that has no comparable counterpart. See Commissioner v. Ed-
wards, 135 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1943); notes 27-29 supra.
77. 585 F.2d at 241. A prospective regulation could alleviate many of the theoretical and
practical problems Judge Wood saw in taxing demand loans under the present statutory and regu-
latory framework. For example, the IRS could set a reasonable interest imputation rate. By so
doing, both the taxpayer and the Commissioner would know in advance whether a loan was a gift
and, if so, the amount of the gift. This approach could limit the potentially broad reach of the
principle, see note 75 supra and accompanying text, eliminate its troublesome retroactive applica-
tion, and most importantly, solve valuation problems.
78. 585 F.2d at 241-42 (Van Pelt, J., dissenting).
Washington University Open Scholarship
262 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:249
usual gift tax analysis requires an initial determination of whether
there has been (1) a transfer (2) of property (3) by gift,79 and then a
determination of the value of the property so transferred. 0 In contrast,
the Crown majority's reasoning is grounded in practical valuation con-
siderations. There is no "gift" because it would be impossible to
demonstrate that the exchange was unequal, since no evidence estab-
lished that the value of the promise to repay on demand was worth less
than the principal amount of the loan."' Alternatively, there is no
"property" because the right to use funds loaned on demand has no
fixed exchangeable value.8 2 The Commissioner's attempt to value the
economic benefit as a continuous gift is based on unfounded
assumptions.8 3
The court decided the unequal exchange issue persuasively: there is
no reasonable way to estimate in money's worth the value of a promise
to repay a loan on demand either at or after the time of making the
loan. 4 The court's determination that a lack of exchangeable value
renders the right to use funds not a taxable property interest is less
79. I.R.C. § 2501(a). See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GiFT TAXES § 24 (3d ed. 1974).
80. I.R.C. § 2512. See notes 12-13 supra for text of this section.
81. See notes 57-64 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text. The court's alternate point-that there is
no authority establishing that a recipient of a demand loan has a legally protected interest 'is.a-ris
the lender-is at best flimsy support in the face of strong authority to the effect that tenants at will
have legally recognized contract rights against third parties. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 932 (4th ed. 1971), and cases cited therein. Surely, a recipient of a
demand loan has contract rights protectible against third parties' interference during the period
the loan is lawfully outstanding. It is unlikely that the court intended this to be a real basis for the
finding of no property interest and, consequently, no gift tax liability.
83. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
84. The Commissioner's method involves repeatedly applying a tax rate assessed on a future
value (dependent on how long the loan is outstanding) to a past, one-time loan transaction. Some
courts have held a court cannot consider facts arising after the date of the gift in determining the
value of the gift as of that date. See Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1949).
However, facts that could reasonably have been anticipated as of the date of the gift may be
shown to corroborate a valuation as of the date of the gift. Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.2d 425 (2d
Cir. 1944); Beck v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 642 (1950), afl'd, 194 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cer, denied,
344 U.S. 821 (1952). See notes 60 & 62 supra and accompanying text.
The court's parallel analysis of the Commissioner's "frustration of estate tax" argument--no
evidence of actual substantial market value of promise to repay as less than the face value of the
note; thus no evidence of impairment of the estate tax-is likewise persuasive. See note 50-5!
supra and accompanying text. Note, however, that demolishing one policy argument in favor of
taxation alone does not strengthen the court's argument, but merely weakens the Commissioner's
position.
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persuasive in light of its similarity to the situation in which the property
interest is merely difficult to value because of the absence of a "market"
or comparable transfers." If the concern centered on the inaccuracy8 6
or theoretical imperfection 7 of the Commissioner's method of valua-
tion, the court could have found that the Commissioner acted unrea-
sonably in setting a value for the right to use funds loaned by the
taxpayer, and thus could have reached the same result on narrower
grounds.8 This approach would have met the dissent's strong argu-
ment that the gift tax is broad enough to encompass the transfer of
economic benefits by interest-free demand loans,89 avoided a harsh tax
result in the Crown case in which other equitable considerations fa-
85. In the absence of a "fair market value," or specific regulatory guidance, the Commis-
sioner is required to consider "all relevant factors" in determining a value. See notes 27-29 supra
and accompanying text. The absence of a ready market or price does not prevent the valuation of
property. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 US. 254 (1941). See generalr Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1304
(1958). Moreover, the court's argument seems to be circular: there is no property interest because
it cannot be valued; because the interest cannot be valued, it is not "property."
86, See note 69 )upra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
88. The Commissioner must act reasonably in determining value. Commissioner v. Ed-
wards, 135 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1943). In Croxn the Commissioner followed the method outlined in
Rev. Rul. 73-61 to value the right to use funds, retroactively applying the rate of interest parties at
arms' length would have charged for the right to use the loaned funds. The Commissioner's use of
a market interest rate can be semantically confusing. The IRS is not seeking to impute interest
income as it does under I.R.C. §§ 482 & 483. See note 32 supra. The interest rate is used as an
estimate of value. The actual amount of interest or investment income generated by the use of
funds by the borrower is irrelevant in determining gift tax liability of the lender, which is at issue
in the Crown case; the income potential from use of the loaned funds is relevant only as one factor
indicating the value of the right to use funds.
Applying the rate of interest that parties at arms' length would have charged for the period
determined by the length of time the lender forebears from recalling the loan probably is not an
accurate estimate of the value for intra-family demand loans. A person may have sought a loan
from a relative because of a higher-than-average commercial interest rate, scarcity of funds, or the
availability of lower (perhaps even zero) interest rates. Thus, the characteristics of each transac-
tion may have to be examined in closer detail to determine more accurately the value of the right
transferred, rather than applying a commercial average and assuming an arms' length bargain.
On the other hand, the average or prime rate certainly is a starting point, and the rate determined
by the Commissioner in the Crown case was arguably a reasonable estimate of the value of the
right to use funds because it was the same as the rate the borrower would have charged had
repayment been demanded and because it was within the current market rates. See note 7 supra.
See g eneralb, R. STEPHENS, G. MA\FIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 4
(4th ed. 1978). Other methods of valuation, such as those found in the regulations under I.R.C.
§ 482, see note 32 supra. while not insuring complete accuracy, have the virtue of predictability
and uniformity. See Duhl & Fine, New Case Allowing Deduction Callsfor Reappraisal of Interest
Free Loans, 44 J. TAX. 34. 37 (1976).
89. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
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vored the taxpayer,9° and permitted the IRS to issue prospective regu-
lations to close the tax loophole.9 This narrower holding would also
better correlate with the court's strong dicta suggesting the IRS has the
authority to tax the right to use funds transferred by interest-free term
loans, which are more susceptible to valuation than the right to use
funds transferred by demand loans.92 If the Commissioner is able to
show that the right to use funds loaned on demand has an exchangea-
ble value or is worth less than the promise to repay, it may be possible
in future cases to limit Crown to its facts.
In sum, although the Seventh Circuit sustained the taxpayer's posi-
tion in Crown, the potential for change through legislative or adminis-
trative action should serve as a warning to tax planners who seek to use
interest-free demand loans to secure tax advantages.93
90. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
91. The court closed the opinion with the cryptic remark that it would not pass on the valid-
ity of prospective regulation providing for taxation. See note 77 supra. However, this is inconsis-
tent with the court's determination that there is no statutory authority for the taxation of demand
loans. 585 F.2d at 241.
92. See notes 50 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
93. In the interim, however, a tax planner may find demand loans useful for splitting income.
See ESTATE PLANNING IDEAS (IBP) (Oct. 1978); FED. EST. & GiFr TAX. REP. (CCH) 9, 12,192.
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